地方政府和高速公路经营者低碳行为的演化博弈分析

doi:10.6040/j.issn.1672-3961.0.2023.106

摘要/Abstract

摘要： 为促进高速公路低碳运营,基于演化博弈理论研究地方政府和高速公路经营者在碳排放配额政策和奖惩机制下的低碳行为变化,通过主体行为影响因素选取构建、求解和分析双方演化博弈模型,并借助MATLAB软件开展仿真分析,研究不同奖惩机制和合作程度对演化结果的影响以及博弈主体行为选择初始概率、奖惩系数分别对演化过程的影响。结果表明:地方政府对高速公路经营者实施碳排放配额政策和运行奖惩机制能够促进政企双方共同参与高速公路运营降碳,且奖惩机制根据政企合作程度动态调整的效果直观有效;地方政府实施碳配额政策且经营者合法排放的初始概率越接近1,双方合作推动高速公路低碳运营的速度越快;碳配额政策实施初期运行高奖惩系数(θ1=0.15,θ₂=0.15)机制会加速高速公路低碳运营。

关键词: 低碳交通, 博弈理论, 数值仿真, 碳配额政策, 奖惩机制

中图分类号:

U4-9

高艳艳,周童,王旭,高洁,戴荣健. 地方政府和高速公路经营者低碳行为的演化博弈分析[J]. 山东大学学报 (工学版), 2024, 54(4): 150-158.

GAO Yanyan, ZHOU Tong, WANG Xu, GAO Jie, DAI Rongjian. Evolutionary game analysis of low-carbon behavior between local government and expressway operator[J]. Journal of Shandong University(Engineering Science), 2024, 54(4): 150-158.

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