考虑动态奖惩的高耗能企业减碳行为演化博弈分析

doi:10.6040/j.issn.1672-3961.0.2024.197

摘要/Abstract

摘要： 为探究不同因素对高耗能企业减碳行为的影响,在考虑高耗能企业同时参与电力市场和碳市场的前提下,对政府监管下的高耗能企业减碳行为开展研究。本研究构建电碳联合市场下政府与高耗能企业的减碳行为博弈模型,分析政府静态奖惩和动态奖惩两种情景下的演化稳定策略,讨论动态奖惩机制下政府电价激励系数、监管成本、监管力度、惩罚上下限等参数对高耗能企业减碳行为和系统稳定速度的影响。算例分析结果表明:动态奖惩机制下,双方存在唯一的演化稳定策略;在不同减碳时期,政府应该平衡好政府奖励上限与电价激励以提高高耗能企业选择减碳行为概率;政府监管力度比监管成本对高耗能企业减碳行为影响更大,建议政府在减碳时期严格监管高耗能企业。

关键词: 高耗能企业, 节能减碳, 动态奖惩, 演化博弈, 电碳联合市场

Abstract: In order to explore the impact of different factors on the carbon reduction behavior of high-energy-consuming enterprises, this paper researched the carbon reduction behavior of these enterprises under government regulation, considering their participation in both the electricity and carbon markets. A game theory model of the government's and high-energy-consuming enterprises' carbon reduction behavior in the joint electricity-carbon market was constructed. The evolutionarily stable strategies were examined under two scenarios: static rewards and penalties, and dynamic rewards and penalties. The effects of parameters such as the government's electricity price incentive coefficient, regulatory costs, regulatory intensity, and the upper and lower limits of penalties on the carbon reduction behavior of high-energy-consuming enterprises and the stability speed of the system under dynamic reward and penalty mechanisms were discussed. The analysis of numerical examples showed that: under a dynamic reward and penalty mechanism, there existed a unique evolved stable strategy for both parties; during different carbon reduction periods, the government should balance the upper limit of rewards and electricity price incentives to improve the probability of high-energy-consuming enterprises choosing carbon reduction behavior; the regulatory intensity of the government had a greater impact on the carbon reduction behavior of high-energy-consuming enterprises than regulatory costs, and it was recommended that the government strictly regulate these enterprises during carbon reduction periods.

Key words: high-energy-consuming enterprises, energy saving and carbon reduction, dynamic rewards and penalties, evolutionary game, joint electricity and carbon markets

中图分类号:

TM73

陈曦,张欢,田洪莉,代春艳,江天炎,毕茂强. 考虑动态奖惩的高耗能企业减碳行为演化博弈分析[J]. 山东大学学报 (工学版), 2026, 56(3): 193-203.

CHEN Xi, ZHANG Huan, TIAN Hongli, DAI Chunyan, JIANG Tianyan, BI Maoqiang. A game study on the evolution of carbon reduction behavior of energy- consuming enterprises considering dynamic rewards and penalties[J]. Journal of Shandong University(Engineering Science), 2026, 56(3): 193-203.

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