基于公平心理偏好的农产品供应链价格补贴契约

山东大学学报(工学版) ›› 2010, Vol. 40 ›› Issue (6): 24-31.

基于公平心理偏好的农产品供应链价格补贴契约

廖莉¹,吴耀华¹,孙国华²

1.山东大学控制科学与工程学院, 山东济南 250061;
2. 山东经济学院信息管理学院, 山东济南 250014

收稿日期:2010-05-25 出版日期:2010-12-16 发布日期:2010-05-25
作者简介:廖莉(1971-),女,四川成都人,副教授,博士研究生,主要研究方向为物流系统优化、供应链管理.E-mail: liaoli@sdu.edu.cn
基金资助:
山东省软科学研究资助项目(2008RKB062)

A price subsidy contract for an agricultural product supply chain based on fairness preferences

LIAO Li1, WU Yao-hua1, SUN Guo-hua2

1. School of Control Science and Engineering, Shandong University, Jinan 250061, China;
2. School of Information Management, Shandong Economic University, Jinan 250014, China

Received:2010-05-25 Online:2010-12-16 Published:2010-05-25

摘要/Abstract

摘要：

研究了价格补贴契约下,两级农产品供应链的最优激励机制设计问题。该供应链由一个生产商与两个供应商构成,生产商为领导者,供应商具有公平心理偏好,通过抽检来确定农产品质量。在风险中性条件下的研究结果表明,当检验成本系数较小且生产随机性较大时,应选择极端团队业绩评价契约,此时的激励效率与纯自利偏好时相同;其余情况下,除了内疚心理较强时极端相对业绩评价契约可能略占优势外,应选择中间联合契约,且激励效率得到了提高,激励效率收益与检验成本系数成正相关关系,与生产随机性成负相关关系。

关键词: 农产品供应链, 公平心理偏好, 激励, 价格补贴契约

Abstract:

The incentive mechanism of a price subsidy contract for a two-level agricultural product supply chain was studied. The supply chain consisted of one manufacturer and two suppliers. The former was the leader, and the latter which had fairness preferences were the followers. The product quality was decided by sampling inspection. The results under the riskneutral assumption showed that, when the inspection cost coefficient was little and the product randomness was strong, the extreme team achievement evaluation contract should be adopted, and the incentive efficiency was the same as that of selfinterest. In other cases, the middle joint contract was better than the extreme relation achievement evaluation contract except when guilt mentality was strong. Also, the incentive efficiency was promoted, and the incentive efficiency income had a positive relationship with the inspection cost coefficient and a negative relationship with the intensity of product randomness.

Key words: agricultural product supply chain, fairness preferences, incentive, price subsidy contract

廖莉1,吴耀华1,孙国华2. 基于公平心理偏好的农产品供应链价格补贴契约[J]. 山东大学学报(工学版), 2010, 40(6): 24-31.

LIAO Li1, WU Yao-hua1, SUN Guo-hua2. A price subsidy contract for an agricultural product supply chain based on fairness preferences[J]. JOURNAL OF SHANDONG UNIVERSITY (ENGINEERING SCIENCE), 2010, 40(6): 24-31.

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